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The 1970s is a decade in which sociology is characterized by
attempts to define its paradigmatic status. In the first systematic
effort to apply Thomas Kuhn's (1970) ideas to sociology,
Friedrichs (1970) granted most sociological theories the status of a
paradigm, or at least a would-be paradigm. However, he relegated
these theories to the status of second-order paradigms while the
first order, or most controlling, paradigms were those that related
to the image the sociologist has of "himself as a scientific agent,"
The prophetic sociologists are those who see themselves as social
critics seeking to debunk social myths while priestly sociologists
are more interested in scientific, value-free sociology (Friedrichs,
1970). Effrat (1972) enumerated a long list of sociological
paradigms which are really virtually all of the extant sociological
theories. Similar in focus, but far more ambitious in scope, was
Mullins' (1973) effort to identify the major theory groups in
sociology.
The most recent effort to analyze the paradigmatic status of
sociology by Eisenstadt and Curelaru (1976) identifies two major
paradigmatic schema in sociology, the most notable of which is
the differ.entiation between, discrete, closed-system, -.. and
open-system paradigms. 'Eisenstadt and Curelaru are more
concerned than the other authors discussed' 'Ii'ere'WIth .the
historical development of the field. Hence their paradigms are
framed within this historical context. In their presentation, the
earliest sociological approach was the discrete paradigm in which
the focus was on separate concrete entities such as ecological
properties, size of groups, or racial and psychological
characteristics. Given the image of the world as a set of isolated
factors, those who operated within this paradigm had difficulty
dealing with such relational issues as emergence, innovation, and
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creativity. This early and primative paradigm left only a small
mark on the development of sociology and persists today in only
isolated domains. It was replaced, historically, by the closed
system model whose supporters saw society as compose? ?f
separate, but interrelated, elements. Those who operated within
this paradigm tended to see one element as dominant over the
others. In Eisenstadt and Curelaru's view (but not mine) Marx was
operating within this paradigm with his emphasis on the economic
sector. This paradigm was replaced, in turn, by the open system
model which focused on the "internal systemic dynamics,
interconnections, and continuous feedback processes among the
components of the social order" (Eisenstadt and Curelaru,
1976:92). Although the evolution of these paradigms follows "no
simple, natural, chronological trend," and there is "considerable
temporal and operative overlapping of the several approaches,"
there is in Eisenstadt and Curelaru's view a long-term trend toward
the open system paradigm.
In addition to those outlined above, there is my own effort
(Ritzer, 1975, 1975a) to analyze the paradigmatic status of
sociology. In this paper I would like to discuss this schema in light
of recent developments in the field.
Unlike most of the observers discussed above, I do not
consider paradigms and theories to be the same thing. Rather, I see
a paradigm as subsuming theories, methods, exemplar and image
of the subject matter of sociology. Employing a definition of
paradigm that employs these four components, I argued that
contemporary sociology is dominated by three paradigms-social
facts; socialdefinitionvand social behavior.: Briefly, the social facts
paradigm focuses on macro-structures, is characterized by the
work .. of -Emile Durkheim as its exemplar, uses
structural-functional and conflict theory, and tends to employ the
interview/questionnaire and historical/comparative methods.
Those who work within the social definition paradigm focus on
the action and interaction that results from the minding process,
accept Max Weber's work on social action as the exemplar, employ
various theories including action theory, symbolic interactionism,
and phenomenology-ethnomethodology, and are more prone in
their research to use the observational method. Finally, those who
2
Paradigmatic Status
accept the social behavior paradigm focus on behavior and
contingencies of reinforcement, view B.F. Skinner's work as their
exemplar, operate from behavioral or exchange theory, and tend
to prefer the experimental method. I will discuss these paradigms
shortly, but first let me say some things about some potential new
sociological paradigms.
In my earlier work I contended that sociobiology and critical
sociology were showing signs of achieving paradigmatic status
within the discipline. If anything, these perspectives show even
more vitality today than they did a few years ago. The strength of
sociobiology is reflected in the enormous amount of attention
devoted to Edward Wilson's (1975) Sociobiology which has been
the subject of review essays in the major sociological journals.
While this may simply be another cycle in sociology's longstanding
love-hate relationship with the issue of how much social behavior
can be explained biologically, it could also be that sociologists will
fmally get over their historic insecurity about biology. This could
be the beginning of an era in which a number of sociologists make
sociobiology the focus of their work. Already people like Pierre
van den Berghe (1975) and Allan Mazur (1972) are identified with
this approach. Similarly, critical sociology, which is strong in
Europe, is of growing significance in the United States. It seems to
be the true inheritor of the neo-Marxism which has been latent in
sociology until recent years as well as the now moribund radical
sociology of the late 1960s. Reflective of this growth is the
increasing familiarity in America with the school ill general (Jay,
1973; Bauman, 1976; Connerton, 1976; Stewart, 1978) and in
particular with ·the work of .its most important modern exponent,
jurgenHabermas (1968).
Although I did not mention it in my earlier work, it seems
clear now that structuralism has the potential of emerging as a new
sociological paradigm. At the moment it remains largely on the
periphery of sociology with the most notable inputs stemming
from linguistics and anthropology, particularly in the work of
Levi-Strauss (1969). Structuralism now has its own practitioners
(Cicourel, 1974) and defenders (Carpenter, 1976) in sociology and
we can anticipate greater interest in the future. However, it is also
easy to forecast heightened political attacks. In fact, we have
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already seen Goddard (1976) unleash an attack on this potential
paradigm. In Goddard's view, if sociology should accept the
structural approach it would "comprise absolutely what is perhaps
its own fundamental premise ... that ideas and symbols are
formed in the material context of given social milieux ... the idea
of a sociological materialism which inaugurated sociology as a
special discipline would have to be completely abandoned"
(Goddard, 1976:132). If structuralism was not a serious contender
for paradigmatic status, it would not have been singled out for
such a vigorous attack.
In addition to these relatively strong contenders for
paradigmatic status, there are a number of other perspectives that
are finding at least limited support in sociology. For example,
Catton and Dunlap (1978) have recently made a case for what
they call "the new environmental paradigm" which focuses on the
limits imposed on human action by environmental constraints. As
is normal with supporters of new paradigms, we find attacks being
made on extant paradigms. Catton and Dunlap (1978:44) are
quite explicit in their assault on the social facts paradigm: "It
began to appear that, in order to make sense of the world, it was
necessary to rethink the traditional Durkheimian norm of
sociological purity-i.e., that social facts can be explained only by
linking them to other social facts."
These attacks on structuralism and social factism bring us
back to the general theme in my earlier work-the pervasiveness of
political conflict in sociology. Although some competition and
conflict between paradigms is certainly useful, it is clear that these
conflicts have frequently h~d,n~gat~veconsequences for the
discipline as a whole. All too often sociologists have exaggerated
the capabilities of their approach --while viciously attacking the
utility ofthe others. This political conflict has made it difficult to
see the intellectual affinity between the various paradigms. Lest
we think that this kind of political attack is restricted to
supporters of potential paradigms, we need only recall Lewis
Coser's (1975) presidential address to the American Sociological
Association.
Coser's attack on ethnomethodology is an extreme example
of interparadigmatic conflict. In his address, and in much of his
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work, Coser is an exponent of the social facts paradigm. As such,
he can be seen as engaging in a politically motivated attack on a
theoretical component of the social definition paradigm. True to
the general character of such attacks, Coser sees few redeeming
qualities in ethnomethodology and subjects it to a brutal attack.
Typical of critics of competing paradigms, Coser engages in a great
deal of name-calling in labelling ethnomethodology "trivial," "a
massive cop-out," "an orgy of subjectivism," and a "self-indulgent
enterprise." The motivation behind this viciousness lies in the fact
that social defmitionism has long been a competitor with Coser's
social factism for preeminence within sociology. This is just the
latest of a long history of attacks by proponents of each of these
paradigms on the other. Interestingly, the ethnomethodologists, in
their reply to Coser, showed far more sensitivity to the dangers of
political conflict in sociology, when they called for an integrated
study of social facts and social definitions (Mehan and Wood,
1976).
Given these general comments, let me turn to a discussion of
the two most important components of sociological
paradigms-theories and methods.
Theories
The theories associated with the social facts paradigm,
structural-functionalism and conflict theory, seem to be of
declining significance in the discipline. It is difficult to find many
young sociologists who are involved in structural-functionalism
..since they were socialized in the 1960s when it was under such
severe attack. Most of the current work in structural-functionalism
is still being produced by the senior sociologists who popularized
the theory in the 1930s and 1940s. Despite continued writing and
the publication of volumes of essays in his honor, Talcott Parsons
is fast becoming an historic figure. On the other hand, Robert
Merton seems to be on the ascendancy with the appearance of
books of his essays as well as a book of essays in his honor. Peter
Blau tried to revive structural-functionalism by making the study
of social structure the theme of the 1974 ASA meetings and
inviting most of the major, and older, structural-functionalists to
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contribute essays. Despite this activity, the fact remains that the
dominant figures in this theoretical orientation are aging and there
seem to be few young thinkers of their stature to take their place.
It appears unlikely to me that the exciting theoretical
breakthroughs in sociology in the near future will be coming from
structural-functionalists.
There seems to be even less life in conflict theory. The
central modern thinker in this tradition, Ralf Dahrendorf (1959),
is under increasing attack (e.g., Turner, 1973) and there are few
working in this tradition. One of the basic criticisms of
Dahrendorf is that his work is simply structural-functionalism
turned on its head. In that sense it betrayed its Marxian heritage. I
believe that Marxian theory will continue its revival in sociology,
but that it will not be within conflict theory. Some (Bottomore,
1975) will return to the original Marxian structural theory
unadulterated by the Marxists (Bender, 1975). As such they will
continue to work within the social facts paradigm. Another strand
will be the critical theorists who will continue to integrate Marxian
structural analysis with some sort of social definitionism, such as
Freudian theory which is currently in vogue among them. In his
recent work, Appelbaum (1978a, 1978b) has also evidenced an
interest in integrating Marxian structural analysis with Marx's
more subjective concerns: "What distinguishes Marxism from
positivist social science is its ability to move simultaneously on
two levels: it formulates the laws of the 'natural history' of
capitalist economic organization, and at the same time
demonstrates the ideological (i.e., historically situated) character
of those laws so that they might be repealed, by self-conscious
workers organized collectively in their own interests"
(Appelbaum,1978a::76, italics mine).
Another theoretical development within the social facts
paradigm will be the growing realization that
structural-functionalism and conflict theory are not really as
antithetical as many have believed. A good example of this trend is
a recent essay by Lipset (1975) in which he points to the
similarities between Parsonian and Marxian theories of social
change.
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While discussion of the illusory schism between
structural-functionalism and conflict theory should diminish, I
think we may see greater recognition of a perhaps more important
division among social factists which is manifest in Peter Blau's
(1975) collection of essays on social structure. It is clear in those
essays that some social factists devote their attention to subjective
macroscopic structures while others are concerned with more
objective social facts. Historically, I believe that Max Weber was
primarily concerned with subjective social facts, as for example, in
his analysis of the. "spirit" of capitalism. More
contemporaneously, Talcott Parsons operates from this position
since the cultural system stands at the pinnacle of his four-system
model controlling the other systems (social, personality, and
biological organism). Indeed, Parsons (1966:113) says: "I am a
cultural determinist, rather than a social determinist." A more
specific example of the study of subjective social facts is Lipset's
(1975: 173) contention that a group's structure is its "standardized
nonnative patterns, rights, rules of behavior, and the like."
Exemplifying the study of objective social structures is Karl
Marx's analysis in Capital of the reified economic structure of
capitalist society. More contemporaneously, Blau's (1975) focus
on parameters of social structure like race, sex and division of
labor is on the objective level. While these two foci (objective and
subjective social facts) are not antithetical, I do not believe that
many sociologists have been aware of this division among social
factists, Yet, it should be noted that in his original formulation
Durkheim (1964) differentiated between material and
non-material social facts.
Although there will be major changes in the theoretical
. "comporient of the social facts paradigm, I believe that changes of
an even greater magnitude will take place in the theories associated
with the social definition paradigm. Action theory seems to be
moribund and of little more than historical interest. Weber has
been dead for more than one-half a century and Parsons has not
practiced action theory in forty years. It is hard to think of any
modern theorists who would identify themselves as action
theorists (Etzioni might be an exception). Symbolic interactionism
seems to be following the lead of action theory into the
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sociological history books. Its place of origin, the University of
Chicago, is now identified with a very different kind of sociology,
Herbert Blumer has retired, and the apparent inheritor of the
mantle, Erving Goffman, has increasingly moved away from the
classic symbolic interactionist approach in his most recent work.
While there is some counter-evidence here (e.g., a new journal
devoted to symbolic interactionism), I still believe that the theory
has lost much of its dynamism.
The locus of interest and power within the theoretical
component of the social definition paradigm is shifting
dramatically in the direction of ethnomethodology and
phenomenology. Alfred Schutz, who played a key role in the
development of both of these theories, is emerging as a central
fIgure in the history of the discipline with an analysis of his work
becoming as important as that of Marx, Weber, Durkheim and
Mead. His contemporary followers in phenomenology (e.g., Peter
Berger, Thomas Luckmann, and George Psathas) are very active
and one of their most widely read products, The Social
Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), is close to
becoming a modern classic. Also of some significance is the growth
in interest in existentialism (Manning, 1973), particularly the
relevance of Jean Paul Sartre (Craib, 1976) for sociology..
However, the big growth field among the theories of social
definitionism is likely to be ethnomethodology. This growth is
likely to take place despite the opposition of major establishment
figures in sociology (Coser, 1975). Ethnomethodology is currently
moving in a number of directions ranging from the descriptive
.a~alyses of Garfinkel and his students to the linguistic analyses of
Cicourel and others (Mehan and Wood,... 1975; Zimmerman, 1978).
Long "tied to -the West Coast because of its own clannishness and
opposition from more traditional sociologists throughout the
country, ethnomethodology now seems to be achieving national
rec~gniti~n. Given the importance of the study of everyday
reality, It would seem that the continued growth of
ethnomethodology is assured. This bright future could be
dampened should most ethnomethodologists leave the world of
every~ay reality and follow Cicourel into the sometimes higWy
esotenc study of linguistics.
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The theories associated with social behaviorism (behavioral
sociology, exchange theory) should continue to be attractive to a
relatively small, but significant, number of sociologists (Michaels
and Green, 1978). The reductionism of these theories is difficult
for most sociologists to accept, but its promise of offering a
technology to ameliorate social ills will prove irresistible to at least
some sociologists (Tarter, 1973). Another development that could
signal a larger audience for theories of social behavior would be a
greater understanding of the relationship between mental
processes and behavior (Staats, 1976).
Methods
One of the most controversial aspects of my earlier work was
the linking of theories and methods within broader paradigms. I
argued that social factists are more likely to use interviews,
questionnaires, and the historical/comparative method; social
definitionists tend to prefer observational methods; and social
behaviorists seem to prefer experiments. I also made it clear that
these are only tendencies; all methods are used in allparadigms.
What varies is the relative frequencies of the use of these methods
by the adherents of each of the paradigms. This fact was brought
home once again by Mehan and Wood (1975) who in their analysis
of ethnomethodology point out that despite its rejection of the
logico-experimental method, some ethnomethodologists are doing
experimental research.
I should. like to use this opportunity to augment what I have
said about the relationship between paradigms and methods,
Earlier I castigated social factists for not doing more
historical/comparative," research and 1 still believe that this is '<an
underutilized method. However, in recent years we have seen a
resurgence of this method in important studies by Wallerstein
(1974), Paige (1975) and Chirot (1976).
These points, however, are minor in comparison to the issues
raised by Snizek's (1976) research which casts doubt on the
linkages between paradigm and method. I cannot repeat all of
Snizek's findings, but his key points are that the linkages are not
as I assert and that the interview/questionnaire method is the
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dominant method in all three paradigms. Although one must laud
Snizek's effort to test my assertions, there are a variety of
problems in Snizek's research that make his conclusions
problematic (Ritzer, 1977). Nevertheless, additional research may
well prove that the cheap and efficient interview/questionnaire is
dominant within all paradigms. If this proves to be so, I would
argue that it stems from the expediency of sociologists of all
persuasions and not from an intellectual affmity between this
method and all the paradigms. If interviews and questionnaires are
predominant, I would then contend that the experimental method
is used more often by social behaviorists than social factists or
social definitionists; the observational method is used more by
social definitionists than adherents of the other paradigms, and the
interview/questionnaire is used more by social factists than the
supporters of the other paradigms. A true test of all of this awaits
a research project that overcomes the problems in the Snizek
research.
Toward Theoretical Integration
The issue of paradigmatic integration is so multi-faceted and
complex that it is difficult to even begin dealing with. However, a
focus on theoretical integration is both manageable and an
excellent place to begin grappling with the issue of paradigmatic
integration.
I perceive a growing interest in, and awareness of, the need
for theoretical integration among a wide range of sociologists.
Among the structural-functionalists.~~fm~ Robert Merton
(197? :30) arguing that analyses of social structures "connects
with other sociological paradigms which, the polemics not
withstanding, are anything but contradictory in much of what
they suppose or assert ... recent work in structural analysis leads
me to spheres of agreement and of complementarity rather than to
the alleged basic contradictions between various sociological
paradigms." More specifically, Merton (1975:31) later says:
"Many ideas in structural analysis and symbolic interactionism, for
example, are opposed to one another in about the same sense as
ham is opposed to eggs: They are perceptively different but
mutually enriching." Among the social definitionists, Mehan and
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Wood (1975:180) say that ethnomethodology "begins by
accepting the reality of an external and constraining world. To this
assumption is added an acceptance of the facticity of ceaseless
reality work. The problem of a general theory of social order is
thus determining the properties that relate structural activities to
structural 'facts.'" More recently, Zimmerman (1978) has rejected
the idea that ethnomethodology is a form of "radical
subjectivism" and a "species of psychologism."
Erhnomethodologists are concerned with subjectivity, but as it
exists within a "supraindividual system, a form or forms of social
organization" (Zimmerman, 1978:9). It is this need to integrate
levels that leads Zimmerman to discuss the possibility of
"interchange" between ethnomethodology and more
"macrosociological" approaches, particularly neo-Marxism.
Among social behaviorists we find people like Staats (1976)
returning to the original Meadian project of integrating the
minding process with traditional behaviorism. Even the new
sociobiologists are able to see the reconcilability of their approach
with other sociological orientations. For example, Wilson (in
Barash, 1977:xiv) admits: "Human behavior is dominated by
culture in the sense that the greater part, perhaps all, of the
variation between societies is based on differences in cultural
experience. But this is not to say that human beings are infinitely
plastic."
Despite a lengthy list of theorists who recognize the need for
theoretical integration we continue to see the tendency to
emphasize, and often to overemphasize, the importance of a
R~t~~~ar.set of variables, Thus, for ~aI!Y social. f~cti§t~_
individuals are seen to be largely determined by macrostructures
while for a large proportion of social definitionists it is individuals
who determine social structures. Similar claims are made by the
supporters of the other paradigms or would-be paradigms.
Although a number of issues are involved in these claims, it seems
to me that the central issue is the relationship between
macro-structures and micro-consciousness. Instead of focusing on
one or the other, sociologists should be concerned with the
dialectical relationship between the way people, endowed with
creative consciousness, create and are created by larger social
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